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Introduction
argued that giving parents freedom to choose schools would improve education. His argument was simple and compelling because it extended results from markets for consumer goods to education. Empirical work has produced surprisingly mixed results on Friedman's prediction. For example, voucher experiments suggest choice can have highly positive, highly negative, or modest effects (Bettinger et al., 2017 , Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2018 , and Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015 . Considering analogous evidence, Beuermann and Jackson (2018) observe that "the lack of robust achievement effects of attending schools that parents prefer is something of a puzzle."
This paper reviews the evidence, pointing out that a key factor behind this puzzle is that households often seem to choose schools based on their absolute achievement rather than their value added-in other words, based on how good their students' skills are, as opposed to how good they are at improving their students' skills.
The paper also offers an explanation for this behavior, one based on three ingredients labor and education economists have highlighted since Friedman wrote on the issue. First, in large part education is an investment into human capital (Becker, 1964) . Hence, households use schools to purchase an asset rather than a consumption good, and this asset is only assigned a value in subsequent arenas like labor markets. As a result, a student's school choice depends on her beliefs regarding how agents like employers will value her skills. Second, labor markets can feature wage premia: individuals of a given skill level may receive higher wages if they match to more productive firms (e.g., Card et al., 2018) . Hence, schools can provide two commodities that affect the value of human capital: skills and job match quality. Third, distance, broadly construed, influences school choice and the placements schools produce. Households often prefer schools close to home (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2017) , and firms may opt to recruit at schools that are nearby or will yield many promising candidates (e.g., Weinstein, 2017) . Further, firms' concern for distance may be endogenous to household preferences; for example, if high ability students prefer a certain school, firms may prefer to recruit there. While we focus on labor markets, similar considerations arise in other venues in which human capital is valued, like marriage markets or college admissions.
We show that under the appropriate conditions school choice can enhance the school sector's performance. When labor markets feature no transaction costs there is perfect assortative matching, with the most skilled workers going to the most productive firms. In this case households' care only about skill, and subject to some assumptions, giving them greater choice raises overall skill. This is the case implicitly assumed by much of the school choice literature.
However, labor markets do feature transaction costs. For example, firms do not perfectly observe all potential employees' attributes, and they tend to recruit at a limited number of schools (MacLeod et al., 2017 , Weinstein, 2017 . Hence, rational income-maximizing households may prefer schools that provide the best job placements rather than the most skills. In this case, increasing school choice may actually worsen the school sector's production of skill. In other words, for students making human capital investments, schools supply a bundled commodity-they provide skills and access to agents that mater later in life, like employers. Since households prefer schools that produce good final outcomes like jobs, in some scenarios they may not choose schools with the greatest value added in terms of skill. In short, choice alone is too crude a mechanism to ensure the effective provision of schooling, and policymakers may need to consider more nuanced interventions in order to enhance school performance and labor market outcomes.
This paper relates to several areas of research. It is relevant to work attempting to determine what drives parental choice in educational markets. The importance of this question to understanding the effects of competition between schools has been noted by multiple authors over the years, e.g., Hanushek (1981) , Rothstein (2006) , Hastings et al. (2009), and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017) .
We also bring together work on labor and education, making the case that thinking of education as investment helps to understand school markets. Much work in labor economics focuses on estimating the returns to an additional year of schooling (Mincer, 1974 , Card, 2001 , Lemieux, 2006 . We focus instead on the return to attending different schools, and the implications this has on the effects of school competition. This relates to theoretical and empirical work on the returns to school identity, e.g., Dale and Krueger (2002) , Hoekstra (2009) , Saavedra (2009 ), Chetty et al. (2014b , MacLeod and Urquiola (2015) , and MacLeod et al. (2017) .
In addition, our work helps to tie research on education and labor income inequality and its inter-generational transmission (e.g., Black and Devereux, 2011 , Autor, 2014 , Chetty et al., 2014 , and Chetty et al., 2017 . We note that if schools help allocate students to jobs, school markets can play an important role in determining the distribution of income. This role may grow if wage premia increase (Card et al., 2013) or if the school sector becomes increasingly stratified (Hoxby, 2009) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical literature and Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 concludes.
Evidence
This section presents an overview of research on the impact of competition and choice in school markets. This is a vast area of work that has grown rapidly, making a full review difficult to carry out in the present format. In light of this we make two choices. First, we focus on only a subset of studies.
1 Second, we note that-especially as it pertains to the model we will present-much of this literature can be summarized in two key findings:
1. There is clear evidence that households prefer schools that have higher levels of absolute achievement.
2. There is much less evidence that households systematically prefer schools with higher value added in the production of skill (i.e., that this preference is strong enough to be the primary driver of school choice).
To be precise, consider individual i who attends school s in period 0 and obtains outcome w 1is in period 1. This outcome could be college placement after high school, starting wage after college, life-time earnings, marriage quality, etc. Suppose outcomes are a function of skill, θ: 1) and that student i enters school s with skill θ 0is and leaves with skill θ 1is . When we ask whether students prefer schools with higher value added, we are asking whether they choose a school s over s if θ 1is − θ 0is > θ 1is − θ 0is . When we ask whether they prefer schools with high absolute achievement, we are asking whether they choose a school s over s if w 1is > w 1is . In practice measures of absolute achievement are usually strongly correlated with each other and with measures of peer quality. Thus, if w 1is > w 1is it is almost always also the case that θ 1is > θ 1is and θ 0is > θ 0is , and isolating a preference for a single measure is difficult. Note that due to data availability considerations, educational research often focuses on test scores as a proxy for skills, θ. One question is whether test scores improve real outcomes like wages, as (2.1) assumes. Chetty et al. (2011) and Chetty et al. (2014b) suggest this is the case: they use administrative data including tax records to show that school and teacher value added measured using test scores do contribute to labor market outcomes.
2 Hence, it is reasonable for researchers to use test score value added as a measure of school quality. Our model will ask if this always makes sense for parents too.
The next section discusses the evidence on the use of absolute achievement as a metric for school quality, followed by a section discussing the evidence on the use of school value added as a metric.
Households prefer schools with higher absolute achievement
The evidence of a preference for schools with high absolute achievement emerges from multiple methodologies applied in diverse settings. A first type of study exploits information experiments. For instance, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) provide a randomly selected subset of households in North Carolina with information on the absolute testing outcomes of schools they are eligible to apply for. They find that households that receive this information are more likely to request the higher achievement schools for their children.
A second set of studies considers whether families are willing to pay more for houses that allow their children to attend public schools with higher achievement. For example, Black (1999) exploits boundary cutoffs in a way that essentially mimics a regression discontinuity design. The motivation is that differences in neighborhood quality (e.g. safety and other amenities like restaurants) are unlikely to change discontinuously at exactly the same boundaries that separate school enrollment catchment areas. Yet, house prices rise discretely just as one crosses into the higher achievement area. Broadly similar results emerge in cities in Australia, France, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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A third type of study analyzes households' preferences in school choice mechanisms. Specifically, these are settings in which parents are allowed to request different public schools for their children. The lists parents submit tend to show a clear preference for schools with better absolute outcomes. This is seen, for example, with respect to high schools in Boston and New York City (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014 and Dobbie and Fryer, 2014) , China (Hoekstra et al., 2018) , the United Kingdom (Burgess et al., 2015) , Romania (Pop-Eleches and , and Trinidad and Tobago (Jackson, 2010) .
4
A fourth set of papers analyzes the impact of large scale national voucher schemes, i.e., settings in which all households are allowed to freely choose schools, and the private sector can fully respond. Theoretical models suggest that if households have preferences for attributes correlated with absolute achievement, then stratification will develop in such settings; for example, the rich or the able will segregate into schools. Epple and Romano (1998) show this can be driven by a concern for peer effects, and MacLeod and Urquiola (2015) by informational concerns-students prefer to be pooled with high ability peers because this reveals they themselves are able. Consistent with these predictions, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) suggest that the introduction of vouchers in Chile led to substantial sorting by attributes like household income.
5 One can see broadly similar patterns of choice leading to increased stratification in liberalized markets including Sweden's school voucher system (Bohlmark and Lindahl, 2007, 2015) and the American and Colombian college sectors (Hoxby, 2009 , and MacLeod et al., 2017 . 
Less evidence that households systematically choose higher value added schools
There is much less evidence that households systematically choose schools with higher value added in the sense of causally raising skill levels, i.e., schools with high θ 1is − θ 0is . A first set of studies focus on parental preferences per se, and provide a useful contrast with the literature reviewed in the previous section. For example Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017) use data from New York City to explore whether the schools parents request suggest that they prefer 3 On Australia see Davidoff and Leigh (2008) . On France see Fack and Grenet (2010) . On South Korea see Moon, 2018 . On the United Kingdom see Gibbons and Machin (2003) , Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) , Rosenthal (2006) , and Gibbons and Machin (2008) . On the U.S see Brasington and Haurin (2006) , Bayer et al. (2007) , and also Figlio and Lucas (2004) . For further discussion on this literature, see the review by Machin (2011) .
4 An analogous pattern emerges for colleges in the U.S. (Avery et al., 2013) . 5 In addition, Valenzuela et al. (2013) show that Chile displays one of the highest levels of school level stratification in the OECD. Further, Mizala et al. (2007) suggest stratification is particularly extensive in the private sector. See also McEwan et al. (2008) .
6 Voucher schemes in the United States are not nationwide, but rather tend to be relatively small and local. The U.S. nonetheless displays a large amount of choice between school districts (Tiebout, 1956) . Urquiola (2005) presents evidence that this type of choice also leads to stratification by socioeconomic characteristics, although Hoxby (2000) finds less evidence of such an effect. 5 schools with higher value added, over and above their valuation of peer quality (i.e., over and above absolute achievement). They find this not to be the case. Related to this, Rothstein (2006) points out that if parents demand school value added, a school's peer group quality will be correlated with its valued added in a housing market equilibrium. This should induce an upward bias in cross-sectional peer effect estimates, one that is stronger in markets with greater school choice. Rothstein finds "no evidence that the school-level association between student characteristics and outcomes is stronger in high-choice markets," suggesting that value added is not a primary determinant of parental choices.
A second set of papers shows that when households are given vouchers that greatly expand their access to private schools, the impact on their children's outcomes is sometimes positive and large, sometimes negative and large, and most often modest in magnitude. For example, a series of papers suggest Colombia's voucher program significantly benefitted students, including by raising their test scores (Angrist et al., 2002 , Angrist et al., 2006 , and Bettinger et al., 2010 . In fact one recent follow-up study suggests that at least for certain types of students, the vouchers more than paid for themselves in that they raised graduates' wages and hence tax revenue too (Bettinger et al., 2017) .
7 In stark contrast, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018) suggest that a voucher program in Louisiana substantially reduced students' test scores. A large number of studies lie in between these two, with the majority suggesting that vouchers have modest effects in multiple dimensions (Epple et al., 2017) . Similarly mixed results apply to charter schools, where some are found to substantially outperform public alternatives in terms of raising test scores, and some to do worse (Chabrier et al., 2016 , Epple et al., 2016 , and Cohodes, 2018 . Consistent with the former, Hanushek et al. (2007) finds that parental decisions to exit charter schools in Texas are indeed correlated with value added.
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A third and rapidly growing literature studies students whose school choice sets are expanded not by vouchers but by gaining admission to selective schools with higher absolute achievement. This work mainly considers public school settings in which households exert (often substantial) effort to get their children into schools with clear cutoff scores that lend themselves to regression discontinuity analyses. These studies similarly produce mixed and often modest findings regarding the effect of greater access to educational options. Some papers find positive effects (e.g. Hoekstra, 2009 , Jackson, 2010 , and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013 , and some find negative effects at least for certain subgroups and along some dimensions (e.g. Barrow et al., 2017, Beuermann and Jackson, 2018) . In between, multiple studies point to modest effects (e.g., Park et al., 2008 , Clark, 2010 , Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014 , Ajayi, 2014 , Bui et al., 2014 , Dobbie and Fryer, 2014 , Lucas and Mbiti, 2014 .
A fourth set of studies considers the impact of information on testing value added, providing a useful counterpoint to the work on information and housing valuations discussed in Section 3.1. Imberman and Lovenheim (2016) consider the release of information on school value added on housing valuations in Los Angeles. This arguably provided the market with new data, as schools' value added and absolute achievement have been shown to not be perfectly correlated in some markets. 9 Imberman and Lovenheim find that the information had little if any effect on housing valuations. Similarly, Mizala and Urquiola (2013) consider a Chilean program that publicly identified schools that outperformed peers with similar socioeconomic compositions, providing parents with a proxy for school value added. They find that the school market essentially did not react to such information: schools' market shares, prices, and socioeconomic composition were unaffected.
Finally, while studies show that (as reviewed above) generalized school choice can produce stratification, the evidence is less robust regarding whether it increases skills as measured by test scores. For example, in the U.S. Hoxby (2000) finds that urban areas in which parents can choose between more districts have more productive schools, but Rothstein (2007) questions the robustness of the result. In Chile, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) find that while vouchers led to massive private growth and stratification, it is less clear that they increased average educational attainment. Indeed if vouchers had fully succeeded Chile would have been done with educational reform. In fact, over the past decade-and despite some subsequent improvement in its international testing performance-Chile has been experimenting with extensive reforms to target vouchers, reduce sorting, and make school productivity more transparent such that it might drive parental choice.
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School Choice and the Labor Market
The key finding highlighted above is that households often seem to choose schools based on their absolute achievement rather than their value added. One interpretation might be that parents are irrational and/or have a taste for schools with low value added. This section shows, however, that integrating school choice with recent developments in labor economics implies that households that care about final outcomes should not always choose schools with higher value added. In some cases, favoring schools with higher absolute achievement will lead to better final outcomes, even when there are no explicit peer effects. We build a simple a model to illustrate this point. The text describes the model and its key results; while the technical details are relegated to the appendix.
Setup
Suppose there are two neighboring school districts, A and B, with the number of students in each normalized to 1. Each district operates a school indexed by s ∈ {A, B}. Each school uses a constant returns to scale technology, and could, in principle, serve all students in both districts. Students who cross the district boundary to attend school must pay a cost C-the motivation being that households usually prefer schools close to home.
11 This cost can be set high enough so all parents use their home school. We will parameterize increasing school choice by reductions in C, since these allow more households to cross the boundary to buy schooling.
Students have either high or low ability,
Each individual observes her ability, but it may or may not be observable to others. We will let ρ A and ρ B stand for the fraction of high ability students in the district denoted by the subscript. When they attend school s, individuals receive value added v s . More precisely, let skill be equal to ability augmented by school value added:
We will assume that ρ A > ρ B and v B > v A (this is important and consistent with results suggesting that schools with better peer composition do not always have higher value added, as reviewed in Section 2). In other words, district A has a greater prevalence of high ability children, but district B has a more productive school. We also make the assumption that
In words, schools close only a fraction of the ability gap. This is reasonable given the evidence that schools do not easily equalize achievement between salient groups (e.g. between blacks and whites in the U.S., or between low and high socioeconomic status students in many countries).
12 This implies that in terms of their skill levels, there are four types of graduates,
with high ability students who went to school B being the most skilled. On the labor market side, assume that the number of employers is equal to the number of graduates (mass of 2). We index these firms by their productivity:
which is uniformly distributed with density 1 γ , where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, γ measures the variation in firm quality. When γ = 0, all employers are equally productive.
We assume a perfectly competitive labor market, such that an individual with skill θ who works at firm β earns a wage:
In other words, there is complementarity and individuals of a given skill level receive higher wages if they match to more productive firms. There is evidence supporting this important assumption. For instance, Card et al. (2013) and Card et al. (2018 ) build upon Abowd et al. (1999 to demonstrate the empirical importance of firm matches for compensation.
13 Equation (3.2) illustrates that in the standard neo-classical framework (Becker, 1964 , Mincer, 1974 , education is an investment that creates an asset-human capital or skill, θ. The value of this asset is not determined by the student, but by the market. Hence, a rational student's school choice will depend on how he believes employers will value his skills in the future. While our focus is on the labor market, a student may similarly consider how going to a given high school will affect his prospects in the marriage market, or how he is viewed by college admissions officers. In all these cases beliefs as to other agents' valuations will guide students' decisions.
14 This might not be a major consideration-as regards the school market-if there were no labor market frictions. In that case there would be perfect assortative matching of firms and graduates, with the highest θ individuals working for the highest β firms.
15 As result, households would always prefer schools with higher value added. Much of the literature on school choice implicitly assumes this, perhaps because it conveniently implies that the only goal of education is skill acquisition, which in turn can be proxied using test scores.
However, a growing literature in labor economics suggests that matching is imperfect: an individual of a given skill level can be paid different amounts at different firms.
16 This suggests that the matching process is expensive: prospective employers cannot screen every person in the market. We therefore assume that employers recruit at only one school (A or B) . This assumption is consistent with Weinstein (2017) , who shows that recruitment costs lead firms to search mainly within local labor markets. Similar considerations arise when schools prepare students for subsequent educational markets. For example, Hoxby and Avery (2013) describe college admissions officers' visits to high schools. They state that while there are about forty thousand high schools in the U.S., a college whose staff visits one hundred "is considered to be exceptionally dedicated and well-funded." Those they visit most are typically "feeder" schools known to produce many applicants. As stated, such preferences on the part of firms and schools may be endogenous to household preferences. For instance, if high ability students are more likely to use a certain school, it may make sense for firms This implies that a rational, income-maximizing household will care not only about a school's value added, but also about the quality of employers its graduates are likely to face. To reflect this, we henceforth consider the following sequence of choices:
1. Students observe their ability and then choose a school (paying a cost C if they use the one outside their district).
2. Students acquire human capital and graduate with skill θ ks = α k + v s .
3. Employers choose one school from which to recruit employees. At this school, they can use interviews or other means to gather information on graduates.
By definition, a market is competitive if there is no coordination of choice. Thus, we suppose that students and firms make their choices independently.
Implications
We use the above setup to study three scenarios. These cases illustrate that in our setup both perfect information and the absence of capacity constraints are necessary for competition to enhance the production of skill. In particular, Case 1 shows that when both are present increasing households' freedom to choose raises average school value added, and thus provides precise conditions under which Friedman's (1955) hypothesis is correct. Cases 2 and 3 show that when either is missing, competition can fail to produce excess demand at the higher value added school, or can even lead to its exit.
Case 1: Perfect information and no capacity constraints
The best conditions for competition arise when information is perfect and symmetric-skill is easily observable-and there are no capacity constraints. In this case employers can identify the highest-skilled graduates at school B (the high value added school). Hence the highest productivity (β) firms recruit there and pick off these students, and in general there is perfect matching. It is therefore optimal for all students to choose school B, and for all firms to recruit there. In this case greater school choice-reductions in C-will allow more district A students to use the higher value added school (and this might put pressure on school A to improve). 18 This is summarized as Result 1:
Result 1: When information is symmetric and schools have no capacity constraints, the labor market will feature perfect assortative matching. In this case, greater competition (lower C) raises average school value added, as more students switch from the low to the high productivity school. This is a formal statement of Friedman's result (proofs and further details are in the appendix).
19 The intuition behind it is that given perfect matching, a school's ability to deliver skills and to deliver jobs are perfectly aligned. In this case, households will choose schools as if skills were the only thing that mattered.
Case 2: Perfect information and capacity constraints
We continue to assume that information is perfect and symmetric, but now suppose that there are capacity constraints: each school can handle only half the total population of students. The question is whether competition will produce excess demand for school B. Capacity constraints immediately raise the question of how seats at more desirable schools are rationed. We consider equilibria under two procedures commonly used in school choice schemes: selective admissions based on ability, and lotteries.
20 In this case we also simplify the analysis by supposing that C = 0 and ρ A + ρ B = 1 (the appendix considers the more general case).
It is clear that one equilibrium is to have all students prefer school B, and for this school to only admit the high ability students. However, suppose that all high ability students prefer school A. In that case all the high productivity firms with β ∈ [1, 1 + γ] will opt to recruit from school A. Ex ante, students do not know which firm will employ them, and hence their expected wage at school A is 1 + γ 2 (α H + v A ). If one of the high ability students considered using school B instead, she could predict being hired by the best firm recruiting at school B, thus receiving payoff (α H + v B ). This person will decide against that option and remain at school A if and only if:
In other words, as long as the variance in firm productivity (γ) is sufficiently large (i.e., the variance in returns to skill is significant enough), then high ability students will prefer school Gilraine et al. (2019) , who points out that the competitive effects of choice will depend on whether schools are horizontally or vertically differentiated.
19 Notice that even in this environment there are potential political economy concerns. Even though the perfectly competitive allocation is Pareto efficient, some students in district B earn lower incomes relative to the situation in which district A students are forced to accumulate lower skill. They would naturally oppose school choice.
20 In many cities students can access "magnet" public schools if they score high enough on a test (e.g., PopEleches and Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014) . Lotteries are also commonly used to determine access; for example by charter schools in the U.S. (Epple et al., 2016) . We do not consider prices as a rationing mechanism. The vast majority of school choice programs around the world do not use prices to ration slots (Epple et al. 2017 ). An exception is Chile's voucher program, which allowed private schools to charge add-ons for many years, but is moving away from that practice.
A.
21 In short, in this scenario even complete freedom to choose (C = 0) does not generate excess demand for the high value added school.
The intuition has two parts. First, households realize that while schools impart skills, they also provide pathways to jobs. Because households' goal is ultimately labor market success, they are willing to trade off school performance in one dimension for the other.
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Second, employers wish to hire skilled workers-they do not care about value added per se (recall θ ks = α k + v s : employers desire high θ but do not care where it originates). In other words, firms want the best employees, and if ability can overwhelm value added (α H − α L > v B − v A ), they will not mind recruiting at a low value added school.
Could a similar equilibrium obtain under randomized admissions? To see that it could, suppose all low ability students choose school B, while their high ability counterparts choose A. As long as condition (3.3) is satisfied, high ability students will prefer school A. Now consider the choice of a low ability student. If accepted by school A, she would be the lone low ability graduate there, and would get matched with the lowest productivity firm, which at this equilibrium has β = 1. This student's expected payoff at school
Hence, under a random admission process, this student prefers school B to school A if and only if:
In other words, as long as the variance in firm productivity is sufficiently small, low ability students will continue to prefer school B. To summarize, in this case having each type of student self-select into one school (high ability into A and low ability into B) is an equilibrium under the random allocation if and only if:
Our assumption that θ HA > θ LB ensures that this condition is feasible. This is summarized as Result 2.
Result 2: When information is symmetric but there are capacity constraints there exist equilibria under which the high value added school experiences no excess demand. This reflects rational self-selection on the part of students, and can happen even with perfect competition (C = 0) and under both selective and randomized admissions policies.
Case 3: No capacity constraints, imperfect information
The final case is one without capacity constraints but with imperfect information. Specifically, we assume firms cannot observe the skill level of every individual in a school-they only observe the average level. In this scenario, suppose that the mean skill at school A when there is no competition (C is very high) is greater than at school B (this follows from our assumption that ρ A > ρ B ). In that case, the most productive firms will hire at school A. As competition is increased (C is reduced), there will be a point at which the high ability students self-select into school A (as in Case 2 above), which in turn leads more high productivity firms to recruit at this school. Finally, when there is perfect competition (C = 0), all students choose school A. Thus we have Result 3.
Result 3: Suppose there is imperfect information in that firms must choose where to recruit based only on the expected skill of students. If school A is sufficiently positively selected (i.e., it begins with a sufficient number of high quality students) then increasing competition (lowering C) may lead all students to prefer school A even though school B has higher value added.
Thus under some conditions allowing families freedom of choice may even lead to the higher value added school being essentially displaced from the market. In the appendix we show that this result depends in part upon having sufficiently high returns to skill (γ sufficiently large). In particular, there are cases in which the combination of competition and sufficient returns to skill leads to school A being the desirable school, with only low skill individuals using school B (Proposition 5 in the appendix). The low skill workers left in school B have the worst job opportunities, since the most productive firms choose to recruit at school A. Hence, in this case increasing competition might lead to worse outcomes for students in less desirable areas, increasing inequality.
To summarize, the essential finding from this section is that, depending upon the context, increasing choice and competition may or may not enhance the production of skill. The key reason for this is that in buying education, households invest in human capital, and the value of this asset depends upon the quality of the match they subsequently make in the labor market (or the marriage market, or later educational arenas like graduate school admissions). As a result, students are willing to trade off a school's ability to deliver: i) value added in terms of skill, and ii) pathways to outcomes like good jobs.
In most cases this leads households to prefer schools that have high absolute levels of ability and final achievement-this is the outcome in all cases above. However, in some scenarios-cases 2 and 3-these are not the schools with higher value added. These results are consistent with the existing empirical evidence (Section 2).
Discussion
Our simple model illustrates that school choice entails a coordination problem. If high ability students and firms were able to coordinate on a move, they would migrate to a higher value added school. But a variety of frictions make such coordination unlikely. Firms may choose a school due to proximity along geographical or other dimensions.
23 In addition, if high ability students prefer certain schools, then firms are also likely to recruit there, generating selfreinforcing dynamics. For example, Hoxby (2009) shows that (at the top end of selectivity) American colleges have become increasingly stratified-the specific college a student attends conveys more information about his SAT score than it did a few decades ago. Hoxby points out that this may be due to decreasing transportation and information-related costs. This is certainly possible, but it may additionally reflect increasingly strong reputational effects that lead the most productive firms to prefer recruiting at the most prestigious colleges, and hence to an increasing desire by students to enroll there.
This also helps to explain why the benefits of incumbency seem to be so marked in education. Once a school or college establishes a reputation as a destination for certain types of recruiters, it will tend to display inertia, staying in that position. For example, in the law industry certain schools are known for sending students into areas such as corporate law, clerkships, or public-interest law. Employers will have an incentive to return to those schools, and good students with an interest in these areas will have every incentive to enroll in them. This situation will tend to persist even if these schools do not produce the highest value added in terms of skills. This idea was captured by Antonin Scalia when he described the schools he preferred his clerks to have attended:
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By and large, I'm going to be picking from the law schools that basically are the hardest to get into. They admit the best and the brightest, and they may not teach very well, but you can't make a sow's ear out of a silk purse. If they come in the best and the brightest, they're probably going to leave the best and the brightest, O.K.?
We also note that the economic literature has been producing increasing evidence regarding another key ingredient in our example: the possibility that matches matter, e.g., that equally skilled individuals can earn different wages depending upon the productivity of the firms they work for. This effect has been discussed for some time, particularly in the sociology literature. For example, books by Kahn (2011) and Rivera (2015) detail the process by which schools prepare students for elite jobs, and of course the networks discussed by Granovetter (1973) are partially developed at school.
Analogous match effects can arise in arenas beyond the job market. Kaufmann et al. (2013) use regression discontinuities to show that admission to elite colleges in Chile improves partner/spouse quality, and Zimmerman (2016) shows that school selectivity can affect the probability that students end up on prestigious corporate boards. In addition, Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2016) and Riehl (2018) present evidence of match effects at college, which may lead certain schools to specialize in the graduates of certain types of high schools.
In addition, in the U.S. there is evidence of increasing skill biased technical change (Autor et al., 2003; Autor et al., 2006) . This could in part reflect an increase in the importance of the match component. If so, it would raise the value of schools that provide good matches, enhancing the role of the school sector in the inter-generational transmission of inequality.
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Related, MacLeod et al. (2017) show that the Colombian university system is stratified by ability, with students who attend more prestigious colleges experiencing an earnings advantage that grows with experience. This in turn generates a demand for prestige.
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Note that our theoretical results rely upon the hypothesis that students understand their skill and choose schools accordingly. However, Hoxby and Turner (2013) find that this is often not the case for many well qualified students from disadvantaged backgrounds. In our framework this would imply that these students would end up with lower quality employment matches, and hence lower incomes. Finally, Result 3 implies that students from disadvantaged backgrounds who attend elite colleges should get an income boost. However, at the margin if students from good backgrounds make optimal choices, then the effect of going to a different college for them should be small. This is exactly what Dale and Krueger (2002 Krueger ( , 2014 find: students with lower socioeconomic status get a significant income boost from attending an elite college, which is not the case for students from advantaged backgrounds.
In short, schools provide both value added in terms of skill and a pool of potential employers or spouses or colleges, etc. This can lead to equilibria with segregation of students into "good" and "bad" schools, with the feature that the "bad" schools may have higher value added.
Another possibility is that households may be unable to observe and/or understand the concept of value added, or to process the information necessary to approximate it. That is, they may find it difficult to disentangle innate ability and value added-after all, this is challenging even for econometricians with access to a lot of data.
27 While this is possible, our analysis shows that even if households understand/observe value added, they may still rationally opt for lower value added schools.
Two elements are necessary for this to work. First, the variance in skill must be larger than the variance in value added; second, there must be significant variation in the return to skill across firms. If additionally employers seek high skill graduates without regard for whether their skill originates in innate ability or value added, one can get self-reinforcing equilibria where high skill individuals and high productivity firms coordinate on certain schools. Thus, the recent rise in returns to skill and college selectivity may be a mutually reinforcing phenomena that have contributed to the overall increase in income inequality. Friedman (1955) argued that introducing choice and competition would enhance education. 25 There is also much work in sociology highlighting the role that education plays in generating inequality, see Neckerman and Torche (2007) .
Conclusion
26 MacLeod et al. (2017) further find that the introduction of a national exit exam reduced the labor market return to college prestige. This suggests that improving the measurement of individual performance may be one way to reduce the self-enforcing nature of the link between school and occupational choice.
27 See for instance the discussions in Rothstein (2017), and Chetty et al. (2017) .
His idea proved influential in part due to mounting evidence of problems with schools' productivity. For example, Hanushek (1997) showed that school systems can increase spending with little to show for it in terms of testing improvements. 28 Hoxby (2003) summarized the implications to argue that choice could have a major impact, leading the average student in the U.S. to score "at an advanced level where fewer than 10 percent of students now score."
In general, these observers did not feel a need to specify or formalize how this would happen. After all, in many areas of the economy market liberalization produces better outcomes without need for any specifics or detailed understanding of the sector in question. Banerjee (2007) provides a critique of this type of approach. Making explicit reference to education, he states that economists are sometimes too fond of "one-stop" solutions advertised as cure-alls. He explicitly singles out school vouchers and states:
It is the same with all of these: incentives, vouchers, ... . We come to them ... as a one-stop solution to the problems of education. To those who believe in [these, they are] ... an abstraction, a metonymy for faith in the power of the market. They do not claim to know how exactly the market will achieve the promised miracle, but it will do it (indeed, for them this unpredictability is part of its appeal).
Banerjee calls instead for economists to "step into the machine"-to get into the details of a sector like education and understand how its performance might be improved.
On the one hand, the argument we have made in this review is consistent with Banerjee's. Once one considers the characteristics of education, it is possible to see that introducing greater choice may not automatically produce better outcomes. In particular, this paper shows that all one needs are: i) the idea that education is partially an investment rather than just consumption, and ii) the notion that schools can contribute to delivering good jobs (or other types of) matches.
On the other hand, the model also raises caveats regarding Banerjee's (2007) general point. Many education economists have truly "stepped into the machine," running randomized trials to identify ways to improve school value added, for instance. Pritchett (2009) points out, however, that there may be limited demand for the findings produced by randomized control trials. Our results suggest one reason for this may be that in many cases schools are not under intense competitive pressure to become better producers of skill, and this will tend to limit their readiness to create or take up innovations identified in experiments.
Finally, exploring the complementarity between school choice and employer search may be a fruitful avenue for research. There is the technical question of how to measure complementarities that are known to play an important role in firm performance (e.g., Athey and Stern, 1998 , Caroli and van Reenen, 2001 and Bresnahan et al., 2002 . In addition, a developing literature in spatial economics recognizes that location affects information flows and worker productivity (e.g., Moretti, 2011) . Davis and Dingel (2019) show that the costs of information exchange may be lower when firms locate close to each other, which gives rise to location-related complementarities. They show that this leads to agglomeration economies that can explain a number of the stylized facts about cities. In this paper we have shown that students' search for schools and firms' search for workers can also be complements, which may explain the segregation of students into schools by absolute achievement rather than value added. The importance of these complementarities are magnified when there are greater returns to skill, and hence our framework is consistent with the observation that colleges have become more selective in a period that has seen increasing returns to skill. In short, integrating school choice into analyses of production complementaries in spatial economies has the potential to provide novel insights on growth and inequality.
A Model Details and Results
This section provides the details for the model and results discussed in Section 3. The model considers three parties: students, schools, and employers. Each student lives in one of two jurisdictions, A or B, with the number of students in each normalized to 1. Each jurisdiction runs a school, indexed by s ∈ {A, B}. Students are indexed by i ∈ I s = [0, 1], where I s denotes the set of students in jurisdiction s. Individuals are of either low or high ability denoted by α ∈ {α L , α H }, where α H > α L > 0. We assume that students can observe their own ability.
29 The fraction of high ability students in each jurisdiction is given by ρ s . In other words students i ∈ [0, 1 − ρ s ) ⊂ I s are of low ability, and the rest are of high ability. The index identifies specific individuals that we need when discussing who chooses a particular school, however the relationship between index and ability is unknown to the market.
Each school s ∈ {A, B} provides value added v s to all its students. 30 The skill of an individual i who went to school s is thus given by α i + v s , i.e. value added augments innate ability to produce skill. We assume that jurisdiction A has a higher proportion of high ability students, ρ A > ρ B , but jurisdiction B has the school with higher value added:
In practice one might expect that school A would have more resources and perhaps thus have higher value added. But research suggests that better-resourced schools are not always more productive, and we make these assumptions to show that the demand for school A is not necessarily driven by value added.
We also assume that schools close only a fraction of skills gaps; i.e., the difference in ability is greater than that in value added:
This assumption is supported by the evidence that schools, even over several years, do not easily close achievement gaps between salient groups (e.g. between blacks and whites in the U.S., or between low and high socioeconomic status students in many countries).
31 Thus our setup has four student types t ∈ T = {H, L} × {A, B} with skill θ ks = α k + v s such that:
To summarize, to make things interesting we rig the model such that school B has higher value added but may produce graduates with lower absolute skill. The question will be 29 This can be realistic at higher educational levels. For instance, students applying to high school or college often have access to imperfect but numerous signals of their own ability. These can include standardized test results and grade point averages. For analyses that illustrate such settings at the high school level see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) ; at the college level see Hoekstra (2009) and Riehl (2018) .
30 Supposing that value added is constant across students is consistent with the literature, which does not find great evidence of heterogeneity in teacher and school effects, e.g., Chetty et al. (2014a) . 31 The point is that extremely successful schooling interventions might close such gaps, but the fact that there is concern regarding the intergenerational transmission of inequality suggests that such interventions are the exception rather than the rule.
whether competition directs students to school B. We also note that there is empirical support that school rankings by absolute achievement do not always correspond to rankings by value added.
32
To introduce elements of competition we assume that students can attend the school within their jurisdiction for free. If they enroll outside their jurisdiction, they must pay a cost C. This could capture the cost of travel or fees imposed by one jurisdiction on students from the other, as happens with state universities. A high enough C makes each school a monopoly within its jurisdiction. Thus reductions in C correspond to increasing competition between schools.
We will assume that a set of firms hire graduates. We index these firms by their productivity, β, which we suppose is uniformly distributed on Γ:
with γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, γ measures the variation in firm quality. When γ = 0 all employers have the same productivity, while γ = 1 corresponds to the case in which the worst firm has productivity equal to zero, and the best firm's productivity equals two.
We suppose there is a return to skill that is greater at higher productivity firms. Formally, the expected wage paid to an individual of type t hired by a firm of type β is:
In words, all else equal firms prefer graduates with higher innate ability, and all else equal they prefer graduates from schools with higher value added. Finally, we assume that the sequence of decisions is as follows:
1. Each student i chooses a school s (i) ∈ {A, B}. If he chooses the school outside his jurisdiction, he pays a cost C.
2. Firm β ∈ Γ chooses the school from which to recruit one employee, s (β) ∈ {A, B}.
3. Students and firms are matched, resulting in a match β (i) and a wage:
We assume that once they recruit at a school, employers carry out interviews that ensure that the better firms are matched with the better students. Since employers choose schools after students do, students' school choice is dependent upon their expectations regarding future employment. This is important because it implies that the effect of increased competition will depend upon expectations. We assume throughout that both students and employers have correct expectations in equilibrium.
32 See for instance Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) .
A.1 Full information case
As a benchmark, we begin with a full information case in which student ability is fully observed by all agents. 33 Suppose that the moving cost C is set sufficiently high such that there is no movement between schools. Since school B has the highest value added, the best employers will recruit there and pick up all the high ability individuals, {α H , B}, i.e., these firms will get the graduates with the highest skill levels. Next, employers will move to school A and offer jobs to the high ability graduates from that school. Once all the high ability individuals are employed, the next firms will return to school B and hire the remaining students. Finally, the remaining students at school A will be hired. Proposition 1 summarizes this result. Proposition 1. Suppose that student ability is perfectly observable, and there is no competition between schools. Then the equilibrium employer match is given by:
1. The high ability students at school B are matched to highest productivity firms:
2. The high ability students at school A are matched to the next tier of firms with produc-
The low ability students at school B are matched next to firms with productivity
β ∈ [1 − γρ A , 1 + γ (1 − ρ B − ρ A )] .
Finally, the low ability students at school A are matched to firms with productivity
In short, when there is perfect information employers prefer the graduates of schools with higher value added, although only the high ability among them. This also implies that if the number of high ability students at school B is small, then the average wage of graduates from school A may exceed that of students from school B. Observe that perfect associative matching implies that all firms with β ∈ [β H , 1 + γ] , where β H = 1 + γ (1 − ρ B − ρ A ), are matched with the high ability students. Now, still in the full information setting, consider the effect of increasing competition by lowering C such that all students can choose schools. Consider first the high innate ability students. Since school B has higher value added, and since it contains some high ability students, they know that it will be targeted by the highest productivity firms.
34 Thus, when costs C are low enough, all the high ability students from jurisdiction A would cross over and attend school B. The same reasoning holds for the low ability students. Thus we have: Proposition 2. For sufficiently low costs of exerting choice, C, the unique equilibrium entails all students going to school B, and all employers choosing employees from school B.
33 In general it is not the case that firms can observe everything about applicants. See MacLeod and Urquiola (2015) for a discussion. 34 We further assume that students do not take into account any externalities generated by their choices.
This result is the fundamental motivation for implementing school choice. In this case both students and employers prefer education as provided by the high value added school. Competition raises average school productivity and average wages. This implies Result 1 in Section 3.2.1. We now show that the presence of perfect information is crucial to this result.
Consider the case in which schools have a capacity of 1 -the number of students in their district. In that case schools must have a method to select students when there is excess demand from neighboring school districts. One method is for schools to use selective admissions. When the education market is perfectly competitive then there is an equilibrium at which all the high ability students attend school B. The question is whether or not it is an equilibrium? 
Proof. Suppose all high ability students choose to attend school A, which given selective admissions, that are all accepted. This in turn implies that the firms with β ∈ [1 + γ(1 − ρ A − ρ B ), 1 + γ] recruit at school A, and the next group of firms recruit at school B (since θ LB > θ LA ). Ex ante, high ability students do not know with which firm they will match, and hence their expected return from choosing School A is:
where w HA is the realized wage type H get at school A. If a high ability student chooses school B she will be matched with the best firm available, then under the hypothesis that firms can observe ability when the interview at a school the best student will be matched with the best firm and we get:
A high ability student will choose school A over school B if and only if w HA ≥ w HB which implies the inequality in Proposition 3.
This result shows that if the variance of the returns to skill (γ) is sufficiently large, then there can be a competitive equilibrium with school A having all the high ability students. Necessary condition for this to hold is that school A can admit all the high ability students. If not, then there will be some high ability students at school B, which in turn implies under ex post perfect information the best firms recruit at B, which in turn implies that the best students prefer B, leading to all the best students going to B.
Finally, note that charter schools use random assignment to mitigate the effects of sorting. This also may not work to direct demand towards school B. This is clear from a simple example. Suppose that ρ A + ρ B = 1, and all the high ability students apply only to school A while the low ability students apply only to school B. In this case students self-select into schools and the random allocation system is not used. In addition, in this case, all the high productivity firms recruit from school A, while the low productivity recruit from school B. For this to be an equilibrium we just need that the students do not wish to swap schools. For high ability students this requires that :
In the case of the low ability students we need:
There are γ that solve this if and only if:
This latter condition is our maintained assumption that the variation in skill is greater than the variation in value added, hence there are γ satisfying (A.3-A.4). In other words, there exists a competitive equilibrium with complete sorting of the high ability students into the low value added school, despite the existence of a lottery admission system. In particular, this result implies that school choice mechanisms cannot be guaranteed to reward the high value added school. Setting ρ A + ρ B = 1 implies Result 2 in Section 3.2.2.
A.2 Imperfect Information Case
In practice firms cannot perfectly observe workers' skill or ability.
35 Now suppose that employers can only observe the average skill of students at a school, and cannot disentangle value added from innate ability.
36 To explore this setting, we will need to characterize the equilibrium allocation of students between schools. To do so, it is useful to let n A H and n
A L
35 This is the subject of the "employer learning" literature. See for instance Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) .
36 School value added is difficult for econometricians to isolate despite having access to large amounts of data. Similarly, teacher value added turns out to be difficult to predict, even using rich observable characteristics; see for instance Rockoff et al. (2011) and Araujo et al. (2016) . In contrast and as reviewed in Section 2, parents seem to generally be aware of schools' absolute achievement, and to prefer those with higher levels of achievement.
denote the number of high and low ability students at school A. The corresponding number of students at school B is given by n
be the total number of students at each school Given this the average skill level of school A graduates is given by:
H analogously defined. Further supposing that the number of high ability students in district A is sufficiently larger than in district B we have:
We know this is possible since θ HA > θ LB . In this case, when a firm β hires a student at school s ∈ {A, B} it expects payoff:ŵ
This reflects the case in which the firm can no longer cherry-pick the most able graduates. The most productive firms will choose the school with the highest average skill, which in turn determines the average productivity of firms that recruit at school s,β s . Students will choose the school with the highest expected wage net of moving costs. Thus, if a student with ability α from jurisdiction d ∈ {A, B} attends school s ∈ {A, B}, his payoff is:
where δ ds = 0 if d = s and 1 otherwise. We can now define an equilibrium. An allocation of employers and students is an equilibrium if neither students nor firms can increase their payoff by switching schools. Let us begin by exploring equilibria for whichθ A >θ B . Since students prefer to work for higher productivity firms, then whenθ A >θ B , the top n
L firms hire at school A, and the rest at school B. Thus without loss of generality, an equilibrium allocation in this case has firms β ∈ β A , 1 + γ hiring at school A, where
The average productivity of firms hiring at school A is therefore:
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Students' choice depends upon two factors: the cost of moving, C, and the difference in payoffs. Given an allocation of students, define the utility from attending school A less the utility from attending school B by:
Given that value added at school B is higher than at school A, this term can only be positive when the diversity in the returns to skill, γ, is sufficiently high. In particular, if γ < 1 and the value added of school B is sufficiently high, then this term is negative, and hence in the absence of moving costs students would prefer school B.
When variation in value added is small relative to variation in ability, then the fact that employers sort across schools can lead to equilibria where the lower valued added school has the best students. To illustrate this, let us begin with the autarky case, where there is no mobility: Then it is an equilibrium for students to chose their local school, and for the high quality firms β ∈ [1, 1 + γ] to recruit employees at school A.
Proof. Consider the allocation at which all students attend their local school. By assumption, average skill is higher at school A, and therefore employers with β ∈ [1, 1 + γ] will choose school A, with the rest choosing school B. Since C > D (α H , 1 − ρ A , ρ A ) this implies that the high ability students at B prefer to stay at B. The monotonicity of D () with respect to α implies that low ability students will not want to switch. Now consider increasing competition by lowering costs C. Further suppose that D (α H , 1 − ρ A , ρ A ) > 0. This will hold for v B sufficiently small (but still greater than v A ). This implies that when C < D (α H , 1 − ρ A , ρ A ) high ability students at school B strictly prefer school A. Once they move, the average skill at school A rises! This further reinforces the preference for school A. Thus we have:
Proposition 5. Suppose that moving costs satisfy: = {ρ A + ρ B , 1 − ρ A } corresponds to all high ability students going to school A, while low ability students stay at their respective schools. Now condition (A.8) implies that it is optimal for high ability students to leave B to attend A, while low ability students strictly prefer to stay at their local school.
Thus result provides conditions under which high ability students prefer school A, even though school B has higher value added. We now show that competition does not solve this situation.
Proposition 6. Suppose value added and the distribution of returns to skill satisfy:
then for costs C satisfying:
it is an equilibrium for all students to choose school A.
Proof. Condition (A.9) implies that D (α L , ρ A + ρ B , 2 − ρ A − ρ B ) > 0, and hence there exists costs that satisfy (A.10). This condition implies that all types prefer school A over school B, and hence all firms hire at school A.
This result shows when the difference in value added is sufficiently small, then even in the presence of perfect competition (C = 0) there can be an equilibrium at which all students choose the school with lower value added. This implies Result 3 in the text. The result depends upon a number of ingredients that can help us understand when we can expect competition to work. First and foremost, is the assumption that employers use school identity to set wages. When this is true, then employers will search for students at the schools that have the highest skill-the sum of innate ability and value added. Second, we have supposed that there are increasing returns to skill-this means that there is a match component to compensation.
The consequence is that we get interlocking decisions. If students expect the best employers to recruit at school A, then students will prefer school A, even when school B is known to have higher value added. Moreover, the incentive to choose school A is highest for the high ability students. The student of the lowest ability might prefer school B, while the better students prefer school A. Of course, these results can be reinforced if students have difficulty observing value added.
This provides a number of insights regarding the impact of choice. First, if the distribution of ability is relatively uniform and schools are equally bad, then a new school with higher value added could enter. The problem is that if there exists a historically "good school," where there is a high proportion of high ability students, then increasing competition could in fact result in increased demand at this school even if its value added is lower. This is driven by high ability students elsewhere who would like the chance to be matched to high productivity firms. The analysis also applies to high school, where one replaces employers by colleges seeking the best applicants.
Thus, the combination of legacy "good" schools, combined with more competition and increased returns to skill can lead to more competition to enter into a legacy school, while reducing incentives to increase value added.
